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Abstract
Common Attack Surface Detection
Yue Xin
In the current software development market, many software is being developed using
a copy-paste mechanism with little to no change made to the reused code. Such a
practice has the potential of causing severe security issues since one fragment of code
containing a vulnerability may cause the same vulnerability to appear in many other
software with the same cloned fragment. The concept of relying on software diversity
for security may also be compromised by such a trend, since seemingly different
software may in fact share vulnerable code fragments. Although there exist efforts on
detecting cloned code fragments, there lack solutions for formally characterizing the
specific impact on security.
In this thesis, we revisit the concept of software diversity from a security view-
point. Specifically, we define the novel concept of common attack surface to model
the relative degree to which a pair of software may be sharing potentially vulnerable
code fragments. To implement the concept, we develop an automated tool, Dupsec, in
order to efficiently identify common attack surface between any given pair of software
applications with minimum human intervention. Finally, we conduct experiments by
applying our tool to a large number of open source software. Our results demonstrate
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The concept of security through software diversity is less dependable today due to
the fact that many libraries are shared between different software applications. If a
library contains vulnerabilities, many seemingly unrelated software may be at risk
of exploits if they all import this same library. As a well-known example, on April
7th, 2014, the Heartbleed vulnerability in OpenSSL caused widespread panic on the
Internet, affecting many popular Web browsers, including Apache and Nginx [13].
Researchers have since studied the popular libraries in order to better predict potential
vulnerabilities [39]. Similar to libraries, the reusing of other existing code may also
lead to similar vulnerabilities shared by different software applications. In fact, code
reusing is a common phenomenon in today’s software industry due to the fact that
copying and pasting accelerates the code development process [7, 12]. However, unlike
organized libraries, reused codes are not traced by any official documentation, which
makes it more difficult to understand their security impact.
To the best of our knowledge, detecting similar vulnerabilities shared among dif-
ferent software applications due to code reusing has received little attention in the
literature (a more detailed review of the related work will be discussed in Section 6).
Most existing vulnerability detection tools, either based on static or dynamic analysis,
focus on generating a list of potential vulnerabilities for a specific software application,
with no indication whether different software may be sharing similar vulnerabilities
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due to common libraries or reused codes. On the other hand, existing efforts on source
code clone detection has developed two main types of detection methodologies, either
based on textual similarity or function similarity, to identify cloned codes in the source
code. While clone detection tools like CCFinder [25] could provide detailed reports
on code similarities between two software, they do not indicate any security impact
of such similarities. In other words, they do not answer the question: Knowing that
two software applications share some similar code fragments, how can we characterize
the likelihood that those software may also share some common vulnerabilities?
The above question is especially relevant at a higher abstraction level, the net-
work, where software diversity has been widely recognized as a viable means to defend
against various security threats, such as worm propagation [41], and to boost the over-
all resilience of the network [38]. More recently, diversity has also been applied to
emerging applications, e.g., cloud computing security [45, 48], Moving Target De-
fense(MTD) [22], and network routing [8]. Most of those works rely on an intuitive
or over simplified notion of software diversity, e.g., different software will not share
common vulnerabilities. Such a notion of software diversity has become insufficient
due to the aforementioned trend of code sharing among seemingly unrelated software,
which can potentially diminish the value of such diversity-based security mechanisms.
For example, using different Web servers in a network provides no security advantages
if they can all be exploited through the same Heartbleed vulnerability.
In this thesis, we aim to address the above issue through defining the novel concept
of common attack surface and developing an automated tool, DupSec, to calculate
the common attack surface of given software. Specifically,
• First, we define the novel concept of common attack surface to model the relative
degree to which a pair of software may be sharing potentially vulnerable code
fragments. This formal model provides numeric outputs to measure software
diversity from security point of view, and such results may be used as inputs to
higher level diversity measures.
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• Second, to automate the calculation of common attack surface, we have devel-
oped an automated tool, Dupsec, in order to efficiently identify common attack
surface between any given pair of software with minimum human intervention.
This tool takes the source code of two software as input, and the result can be
either reported in an XML file or stored in the database.
• Third, we conduct experiments by applying our tool to a large number of open
source software. To make our experiment results more convincing, we have col-
lected software applications belonging to seven different categories from Github
in order to evaluate our tool. More than 80,000 combinations of software ap-
plications have been downloaded and analyzed in our experiments. The results
are analyzed based on various features of the software applications. Our re-
sults demonstrate many seemingly unrelated real-world software indeed share
significant common attack surface.
• Finally, we also study the correlation between our experimental results and real-
world vulnerabilities related to the C language. We have manually examined
the shared vulnerable code fragments discovered by our tool, and verified that
similar vulnerabilities which correspond to the common attack surface do exist
in the software.
This thesis makes three main contributions as follows.
• First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort on formally modeling
the impact of code reusing on security. Our common attack surface model
provides a foundation and inputs to other higher level security-through-diversity
models.
• Second, the tool we have developed to calculate common attack surface between
software applications may provide useful references for end users to choose soft-
ware applications in order to achieve sufficient software diversity in a network,
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and to reuse knowledge about existing vulnerabilities in a software to potentially
identify similar ones in other software.
• Third, our experimental results prove the existence of similar vulnerabilities
shared by seemingly unrelated software due to code sharing. We believe this
finding would attract interest from both practitioners and researchers to re-
examine the concept of software diversity and its security implication.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
concept of common attack surface following a motivating example and discussions on
the challenges of designing such a formal model. In Section 3, we define two measures
to calculate the common attack surface among software applications. In Section 4,
we design and implement a tool called DupSec to calculate common attack surface
among software applications. In Section 5, we evaluate our model and tool through
experiments with real world software. In Section 6 we review related work and in




In this section, we first present motivating examples through discussing several use
cases in Section 2.1. We then describe the background knowledge in Section 2.2.
Finally, we highlight the challenges before defining the formal model of common
attack surface in Section 3.
2.1 Motivating Examples
We will use two fictitious websites to describe our use cases. The first website is
referred to as https://apachesite.com (apache site), which is equipped with an Apache
HTTP server running on host 1 (h1) and Cyrus IMAP server on host 2 (h2). The
second website, called https://nginxsite.com (nginx site), is equipped with only Nginx
HTTP server running on host 3 (h3).
User Case 1 Vulnerability Discovery and Patch Reuse: Clearly, all the hosts are
equipped with different software applications in each website. Assume an attacker on
the Internet wants to compromise the websites, without considering any code clones
among those software applications, the system administrators of both websites as
well as most existing security metrics would consider that the attacker would need
to employ three different exploits (for the three software applications) in order to
5
achieve his/her goals. However, as we will show, similar vulnerabilities due to cloned
codes may exist among those different software applications, which may render the
attacker’s job much easier by using the same exploit repeatedly.
For example, consider again the well known Heartbleed vulnerability which drew
world-wide attention in April 2014 [13]. This vulnerability affects an estimated
24-55% of popular HTTPS sites, and it gives attackers accesses to sensitive mem-
ory blocks on the affected servers, which may potentially contain encryption keys,
usernames, passwords, etc. More specifically, the vulnerability is discovered inside
OpenSSL which is an extension of many Web and email server software applications
for supporting the https connections. In particular, the aforementioned three software
applications assumed in our two example websites, namely, two Web server applica-
tions (Apache and Nginx ), and one mail server (Cyrus IMAP server) are all affected
by this vulnerability. In such a case, attackers now have the ability to exploit one
vulnerability in order to compromise all three servers.
Figure 1 shows technical details about Heartbleed and how it functions in re-
lation to these three software applications. The three software applications will
simply hand the encryption tasks to the OpenSSL extension. The vulnerability
appears after the software applications make external calls to the OpenSSL exten-
sion. By calling the same functions to establish SSL connections, the API invocation
SSL_CTX_new(method) is a function for establishing SSL content, SSL_new() is for
creating SSL sessions, and SSL_connect() for launching SSL handshakes. To exploit
the vulnerability, attackers would construct a specific heartbeat request with a fake
length and send it to the servers in order to extract sensitive memory blocks from the
servers.
On the other hand, not all the server software applications that use SSL con-
nections are affected by this vulnerability. For example, Microsoft IIS does not use
OpenSSL to create secure connections and hence is immune to the vulnerability.
Therefore, our objective in this use case is to automatically capture and system-
atically measure the likelihood of such vulnerabilities that are shared by different
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https://www.apachesite.com SSL_engine_init.c...ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);...mod_ssl.c/* Create a new SSL connection with the configured server SSL context and* attach this to the socket...if (!(ssl = SSL_new(mctx->ssl_ctx))) { ...ssl_engine_io.c...if ((n = SSL_connect(filter_ctx->pssl)) <= 0) { ......SSL_do_handshake(ssl);... ngx_event_openssl.c...ngx_int_t  ngx_ssl_create(ngx_ssl_t *ssl, ngx_uint_t protocols, void *data){  ssl->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());...ngx_int_t  ngx_ssl_create_connection(ngx_ssl_t *ssl, ngx_connection_t *c, ngx_uint_t flags){  ngx_ssl_connection_t  *sc;    sc = ngx_pcalloc(c->pool, sizeof(ngx_ssl_connection_t));... sc->buffer = ((flags & NGX_SSL_BUFFER) != 0);sc->connection = SSL_new(ssl->ctx);...ngx_int_t ngx_ssl_handshake(ngx_connection_t *c){   ...ngx_ssl_clear_error(c->log);    n = SSL_do_handshake(c->ssl->connection); ...ctx=SSL_CTX_new(method); // Create SSL content...SSL=SSL_new(ctx);// create SSL session...SSL_connect(SSL);// Launch SSL handshake...Heartbeat Request123Request Length = 30,000 bytes Actual Length = 3 bytesHeartbeat response123<...>mycertificatepassphrase<...>username&password,etcResponse Length =30,000bytes tls.c...#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >=0x10100000L)s_ctx =SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());#elses_ctx =SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());...tls_conn = (SSL *) SSL_new(s_ctx);...if ((sts = SSL_connect(tls_conn)) <= 0) {...Cyrushttps://www.nginxsite.com
Figure 1: Heartbleed in Apache and Nginx
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software applications due to cloned codes. Consequently, the same software patches
or fixes could be applied or developed to mitigate those vulnerabilities in a simi-
lar manner, which may potentially reduce the time and effort spent in developing
vulnerability patches and fixes.
Use Case 2 Providing Inputs to Diversity Mechanisms: Different notions of diver-
sity have been used for security purposes, e.g., compile-time diversity [15], run-time
diversity [28], automatic patch generation [49], and automatic signature detection [51].
Diversity has been employed to enhance security in terms of preventing attacks and
worm propagation for various software applications, e.g., e-mail topologies, client-
server file shares, and sensor networks [40]. Opportunistic diversity may already exist
among different software systems [52], and diversity can also be automatically gener-
ated by breaking the monoculture and adding more features to the applications [33].
However, as the basis of most of those diversity mechanisms, the definition of
software diversity remains unclear in the face of code reusing. For example, in our
apache site, the two hosts h1 and h2 are equipped with different software applications
that are remotely accessible, a diversity mechanism will thus consider this website as
having sufficient diversity in terms of remote attacks over the network [56]. However,
as we have explained, the two seemingly different software applications may in fact
share similar vulnerabilities due to code reusing, which means the website is not
necessarily diversified enough against remote attacks.
While Heartbleed remains a good example, the impact of code reusing upon soft-
ware diversity is certainly not limited to this specific case. In fact, the practice of code
reusing and its impact on software diversity may have become increasingly pervasive
today. First, it is very common for different software to import the same popular
library functions, e.g., those from C standard library which have a history of includ-
ing high risk memory-related vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflow. The HeartBleed
vulnerability is also caused by the fact that the developers of different software appli-
cations have essentially all invoked the same library function memcpy() without any
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boundary check. While the practice of using existing library functions reduces the
time and cost for software development, it also increases the chance that the same
vulnerability may be introduced to multiple software applications.
The impact of code reusing upon software diversity is not limited to importing
common library functions. For example, both the Apache and Nginx projects are Web
servers developed in C language. The similar functionality of both software means
there is a high chance that the developers of both projects may reuse the same or
similar codes in addition to importing common library functions. In many software
development companies, on-board training provides tutorials for new employees to
learn how to build codes according to the company’s existing practice and guidelines.
Such a process reduces the cost of code management and facilitates the transfer of
knowledge and information, but at the same time it further increases the chance for
passing similar vulnerabilities to all the company’s software applications [6].
Therefore, our objective in this use case is to formally model and automatically
compute the degree of software diversity from the security point of view, while tak-
ing into consideration common library functions and reused codes among different
software applications. Such results on software diversity could be taken as inputs by
other higher level diversity mechanisms in order to allow them to better deal with
the existing similarity between different software.
Use Case 3 Moving Target Defense: The moving target defense (MTD) concept
is a relatively new approach to security and a potential direction for improving the
security of static systems [16]. The main idea of MTD is to continuously change the
system configurations which would hopefully interrupt any attacker’s process in com-
promising the system [57]. In our apache site, the host h1 is equipped with Web server
applications, and administrators could implement MTD by constructing a resources
pool of web server applications, e.g., 〈Apache,Microsoft IIS,Nginx, Lighttpd,
Tomcat,GoogleGWS,LiteSpeed, IBM Web Server, Tengine, Jetty〉 which are all
different Web server applications. Assume any of the software from the resource pool
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could fulfill the functionality requirements and the currently deployed software ap-
plication on h1 is Apache. An administrator may change the server’s configuration
by switching from one software application to another inside the resource pool. In
theory, all those different Web servers would have different attack surface and hence
rotating among them from time to time will make attackers’ job harder. However,
we have seen that this may not always be the case as the same or similar vulnera-
bilities may exist among supposedly different software applications, as demonstrated
in Figure 1. In fact, other than Microsoft IIS and Jetty, all the aforementioned Web
servers will be affected by the same vulnerability [13]. In such a case, changing the
configuration may not interrupt the attack process, and MTD becomes less effective
due to the weakened software diversity.
Therefore, in this use case, our objective is to provide a better foundation to
MTD by defining software diversity from the security point of view, while taking into
consideration of potential cloned codes among different software. To follow the pre-
vious example, there are more than 500 Web server software applications published
on GitHub, and our study will indicate significant amounts of cloned code segments
among these software applications. The effectiveness of MTD mechanisms can be
improved by choosing the right software for the resource pool based on the under-
standing of similarities between software applications.
2.2 BackGround
Before defining the model of common attack surface, we discuss some background
concepts. We take two steps towards measuring the potential impact of cloned codes
on security. The first step is to find similar code fragments in different software
applications. The second step is to design security measures in order to characterize
the security impact of such code fragments.
In order to detect the similarity of source codes, several algorithms and tools have
been proposed in existing researches on clone detection. Generally speaking, there
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are different types of code clone detection (a detailed review of related works will be
given in Section 6) that can be categorized into two classes, those based on textual
similarity and those on functional similarity. Tools are developed based on techniques
belonging to following categories, text-based techniques, token-based techniques, tree-
based techniques, graph-based techniques, metrics based clone techniques and hybrid
techniques [47].
We use CCFinder [25], a language-based source code clone detection tool, to
find cloned code fragments within given software. As one of the leading token-based
detection tools, CCFinder has received the Clone Award in 2002, and it supports
multiple languages, including C, C++, Java, and COBOL. The first step in the clone
detection process is to obtain the language originated preprocessing, which can be
seen as a normalization process. Tokens are generated from the source code after the
lexical analysis and concatenated into token sequences. Then, the generated tokens
are applied to the matching process. During the matching process, the algorithm
suffix-tree matching is used to enhance the efficiency of matching, and the location
of clone information is represented as a tree with nodes storing information about
identical subsequences [25].
However, the result from clone detection tools, including CCFinder, only reveals
similar code fragments between source codes, without indicating their potential se-
curity impact. The primary challenge is therefore to understand and measure the
potential impact of clone detection on security in terms of leading to potential vul-
nerabilities.
A promising solution is to apply the attack surface concept [36], which is a well-
known software security metric that measures the degree of software security expo-
sure. The measurement is taken along three dimensions, the entry and exit points
(i.e., methods calling I/O functions), channels (e.g., TCP and UDP), and untrusted
data items (e.g., registry entries or configuration files) (denoted as 〈M,C,D〉 ). Attack
surface measures the intrinsic properties of a software application regardless of exter-
nal factors such as the existence of exploits. Therefore, attack surface may potentially
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cover both known and unknown vulnerabilities. In this thesis, we apply the attack
surface concept to quantify the cloned code fragments in terms of their likelihood to
lead to potentially similar vulnerabilities shared between software applications. We
focus on entry and exit points and do not consider channels and untrusted data items
for simplicity.
We discuss a key challenge in applying the attack surface concept to charac-
terize cloned code fragments among software applications. As we have described,
entry/exit points are the methods calling I/O functions, e.g., in Figure 2, function
handle_response() is an entry point since it calls fseek() and ftell (which are I/O
functions from standard C library), so is function quicksand_mime() in Figure 3.
1 fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
2 size = ftell(fp);
3 fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
4 snprintf(fsize, 32, "Content−Length: %d\r\n\r\n", size);
Figure 2: /Simple-Webserverche/server.c handle_response()
1 long fsize = ftell(f);
2 fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
3 free(decoded_mime);
Figure 3: /quicksand_lite/libqs.c quicksand_mime()
A naive application of attack surface concept here would indicate both functions
count as one entry point inside the attack surface, and hence, they have the same
security impact. However, such an application is too coarse-grained since the two
functions clearly include different number of calls to I/O functions (three calls in
handle_response() and two in quicksand_mime()). The different numbers of I/O
function calls should be taken into account while measuring the chance to cause vul-
nerabilities inside the software applications. In our model, we will refine the entry/exit
point concept from security point of view.
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Chapter 3
The Model of Common Attack
Surface
In this chapter, we model the similarities between two software applications through
two security measures, the conditional common attack surface measure (ccas) and the
probabilistic common attack surface measure (pcas).
First, the conditional common attack surface measure (ccas) is designed to be
asymmetric for use cases in which one software is of particular interest and evaluated
against other software. For example, suppose a company has developed a new Web
server application and want to understand any similarities between their product and
other similar Web servers, e.g., Apache and Nginx. The developers want to calculate
the percentage of attack surface their product may share with any other software
applications. In such a case, the developer can apply the measure ccas to measure
the common attack surface shared by their software application when compared to
other software applications.
Second, in a slightly different scenario, an administrator wants to understand the
level of software diversity between any two software applications inside the network.
In such a case, both software applications in comparison are equally important, so
the symmetric measure pcas can be applied, which will yield a unique measurement
of similarity between two software applications. The following details the ccas and
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pcas measures.
3.1 Conditional Common Attack Surface
Suppose we want to measure the common attack surface of one software application
in comparison to another. We need first to identify the clone segments between the
two software applications. As an example, Figure 4 demonstrates an instance of clone
segments between two software applications where the left upper corner of the figure
depicts a Web server application SimpleWebserver, and the remainder of the figure
depicts an SSH application SSHBen. In the figure, the Clone id is a unique number
indicating a group of related clones inside both software applications. For example,
the code segments inside the solid line blocks indicate the clone segments of both
software applications that belong to the same Clone id 28, and the dashed line blocks
are the clone segments that belong to the Clone id 78. The same part of the code may
appear in two different clone ids, e.g., line 146 and 147 in Simple-Webserver appear
in both clone ids.
In the above example, it is clear that the clone segments belonging to the same
Clone id are not identical between the two software applications. Therefore, the clone
segments must be referred to in an asymmetric manner as well. We denote by an
abstract function c(.) the clone segments between two software applications, with
c(A|B) representing the clone code segments in software application A in comparison
to software B, which is not necessarily identical to the clone code segments in software
application B, c(B|A).
Example 1 In Figure 4, Clone id 78 contains five clone segments which corresponds
to one segment inside SimpleWebserver and four segments in SSHBen. The I/O func-
tion calls inside the clone segments are 〈strcat, fopen, fseek, ftell〉 (here the match-
ing between the two clone segments is inexact [25], since strcat does not exist in
SSHBen). As to Clone id 28, the I/O function calls inside the clone segments are
〈strcat, fopen〉.
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Clone id = 28                 144 get_time_string(curr_time);             145 strcat(response, curr_time);       146 strcat(response, "\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n");       147  fp = fopen(page, "r");       148  fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);       149  size = ftell(fp);Simple-Webserver/server.c   handle_response()131 strcat(user_name,"\t");132 strcat(user_name,data1);133 strcat(user_name,"\n");134 fp=fopen("pass.txt","a"); Clone id = 78  95 send(sd,fname,sizeof(fname),0);96 fp=fopen(fname,"rb");97 fseek(fp,0L,SEEK_END);98 m=ftell(fp);158 {recv(connected,fname,sizeof(fname),0);159 fp=fopen(fname,"rb");160 fseek(fp, 0L, SEEK_END);161 m = ftell(fp);169 send(sd,fname,sizeof(fname),0);170 fp=fopen(fname,"rb");171 fseek(fp,0L,SEEK_END);172 m=ftell(fp);279 {recv(connected,fname,sizeof(fname),0);280 fp=fopen(fname,"rb");281 fseek(fp, 0L, SEEK_END);282 m = ftell(fp);/SSHBen/ssh/server.c build_header() /SSHBen/ssh/client.c client_copy()/SSHBen/ssh/client.c client_recv_udp_msg()/SSHBen/ssh/server.c sendfiletosocket()/SSHBen/ssh/server.c scheduler()
Figure 4: An Example of Clone Segments
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Definition 1 (Common Attack Surface) Given two software applications, the com-
mon attack surface is defined as the multi-sets (which preserves duplicates) of I/O
function calls that exist inside the clone segments of each software application with
the same Clone id i, denoted as casi(B|A) and casi(A|B), respectively.
Example 2 To follow our example, we have cas78(SimpleWebserver|SSHBen) = 〈fopen,
fseek, ftell〉 and cas78(SSHBen|SimpleWebserver) = 〈fopen, fseek, ftell, fopen, fseek,
ftell, fopen, fseek, ftell, fopen, fseek, ftell〉.
To measure the similarity between two software applications in terms of common
attack surface, we will need to calculate the size of the attack surface, i.e., the number
of I/O function calls. As we can see from the above example, the clone segments
inside two software applications for the same Clone id are not necessarily a one-to-
one mapping, e.g., for Clone id 78 there is one segment inside Simple-Webserver and
four segments inside SSHBen. Therefore, we will count the exact number of I/O
function calls inside the common attack surface of each software application.
Example 3 For Clone id 78, this gives 3 for Simple-Webserver and 12 for SSH-
Ben. As to Clone id 28, both software applications have one clone segment, with 3
I/O function calls (〈strcat, strcat, fopen〉) in Simple-Webserver and 4 in SSHBen
(〈strcat, strcat, strcat, fopen〉). The first strcat in Clone id 28 is considered as part
of the common attack surface but not in Clone id 78. On the other hand, fopen is
considered in both Clone ids, and hence we count fopen only once between the two
Clone ids for Simple-Webserver. Based on those discussions, we can calculate the
total number of I/O function calls for both Clone id is 5 for Simple-Webserver and
16 for SSHBen.
The conditional common attack surface defined below represents the ratio between
the size of the common attack surface of a software application (with respect to
another software application) and the total number of all I/O function calls inside
that software. This ratio roughly indicates the degree of similarity between the two
software applications in terms of common attack surface.
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Definition 2 (Conditional Common Attack Surface) Given two software ap-
plications, A and B, the conditional common attack surface, denoted as ccas(B|A)
and ccas(A|B), assume n is the total number of clone ids between A and B, and ASA
and ASB the total number of I/O functions inside A and B, respectively. We define
the conditional common attack surface as:
ccas(A | B) =
∑n
i=1 | cas(A | B) |
ASA
ccas(B | A) =
∑n
i=1 | cas(B | A) |
ASB
Example 4 The attack surface (i.e., the total number of I/O function calls) of
Simple-Webserver and SSHBen are 16 and 182, respectively. We thus have ccas(SSHBen |
SimpleWebserver) = 16
182




3.2 Probabilistic Common Attack Surface
In the previous section, the conditional common attack surface measure ccas is de-
signed for evaluating one software application against others. In this section, we
take a different approach of defining a symmetric probabilistic common attack sur-
face measure for two software applications. The main purpose of this measure is to
estimate the amount of effort that a potential attacker may reuse while attempting
to compromise both software applications. The nature of such a use case implies the
measure should be symmetric.
We apply Jaccard index for this purpose, which is commonly defined as J(A,B) =
A∩B
A∪B and used for analyzing the similarity and diversity between the two sets. To apply
this measure in our case, we need to define both the intersection and union of the
attack surface of two software applications. In the previous section, the intersection
has been defined as the common attack surface. However, as we mentioned, the
common attack surface of two software applications are asymmetric in nature, which
17
may contain different clone segments for each software in comparison. Instead, we
will define the intersection between the attack surface of two software applications
differently using the standard multi-set intersection operation, which is described
below.
Definition 3 (Intersection of Multi-Sets [50]) Given two multi-sets A = 〈A, f〉
(where f is the multiplicity function such that for any a ∈ A, f(a) gives the number
of occurrences of a in the multi-set) and B = 〈A, g〉, then their intersection, denoted
as A∩B, is the multi-set 〈A, s〉, where for all a ∈ A:
s(a) = min(f(a), g(a)).
Example 5 Assume U ={a,a,a,b} and V = {a,a,b,b}, if we apply the multi-set op-
eration as defined above, we have U∩V = {a,a,b}.
The union of the attack surface between two software applications can be defined
as ASA ∪ ASB = ASA + ASB − cas(B | A) ∩ cas(A | B). With both the union and
intersection operations defined, we can now define the probabilistic common attack
surface measure as follows.
Definition 4 (Probabilistic Common Attack Surface Measure) Given two soft-
ware applications A and B, with their attack surface ASA and ASB and the common
attack surface cas(B|A) and cas(A|B), respectively, the probabilistic common attack
surface of A and B is defined as:
pcas(A.B) =
| cas(B | A) ∩ cas(A | B) |
| ASA ∪ ASB |
Example 6 The size of attack surface in Simple-Webserver and SSHBen is 16 and
182, respectively. From our previous discussions, we have cas(SSHBen | Simple-
Webserver)∩cas(SimpleWebserver | SSHBen) = 〈strcat, strcat, fopen, fopen, fseek,
ftell〉 whose size is 6, and hence pcas(SSHBen.SimpleWebserver) = 6
16+182−6 =
18
3.1%. Intuitively, this result indicates, among all the attack surface (i.e., I/O func-
tion calls) which may potentially cause either known or unknown vulnerabilities, the
percentage of attack surface is shared between the two software applications. Such a
result, when applied to all the remotely accessible software applications inside a net-
work, may allow administrators to estimate and consequently improve the degree of




To automatically identify and measure the common attack surface between software
applications, we design and implement a tool, DupSec, to generate and visualize
traceable outputs. We first detail the architecture and various components of DupSec
in Section 4.1, and then discuss the automated analysis using our tool in Section 4.2.
4.1 The Main Components of DupSec
Figure 5 provides a high-level architecture of our tool, DupSec, which consists of three
components, the clone detection module, the source code labeling and prediction
module, and the visualization module. Those modules work together to identify and
measure the common attack surface between two given software applications. The
following details each module.
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Token to Line NumberBinary to TokenClone Detection Binary Result Final Result DBFinal ResultDirect I/O
Figure 5: Architecture of DupSec
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4.1.1 The Clone Detection Module
As we discussed briefly in Section 2.2, we choose CCFinder as the basis of our clone de-
tection module. The following details challenges and solutions for applying CCFinder.
Since our tool Dupsec is developed and operated under Linux, we apply only the
back-end of CCFinder. While the Microsoft Windows version of CCFinder can be
more easily installed, installing the back-end component on Linux is more challenging.
Specifically, the default Linux version of CCFinder is designed to work on Ubuntu
9. With Ubuntu upgraded to the version 14 and newer, many libraries are no longer
valid for CCFinder. Therefore, several libraries need to be installed separately, e.g.,
libboost-dev and libicu-dev. In practice, various libraries may be needed based on
the version of the Linux system, which can be determined based on the warnings
and errors produced by CCFinder. The minimum requirement of Dupsec is for the
CCFinder back-end to normally execute any CCFinder command and produce clone
detection correctly. Once CCFinder is successfully installed, the clone segments can
be fetched from the output files.
Various parameters can be fine tuned in CCFinder to customize its execution
mode [24]. Although default parameters exist, for the purpose of acquiring better
results, parameters should be adjusted based on specific applications’ needs. Table 1
lists the three options which have been adjusted in our module to achieve the desired
clone results.
Option Description Parameter
-b the minimum length of the detectedcode clones 20
-t the minimum number of types oftokens involved 8
-w to specify whether to detect inner-file clones or/andinter-file clones f-w-g+
Table 1: The Parameters of CCFinder
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As shown in the Table 1, the parameter b and t are the two parameters that
control the length of the clone code segments, which is important to our application.
Specifically, parameter t represents the type of tokens used in clone detection
based on the rules of CCFinder. The basic expression in C language, such as int
A;, consists of three tokens: the integer, identifier, and ‘;’. Therefore, as long as the
setting of the parameter t is larger than three, the effect of t upon clone detection
will be insignificant for this specific application.
In addition, based on our experimental results, we find that when parameter b
is larger than 30, no clone result would be reported. Therefore, for the purpose of
obtaining clone segments, parameter b is set to be less than 30. The trend of the error
rate for the two software applications with different values of parameter b can be seen
in Figure 6. Based on Figure 6, when parameter b is around 18-23, the error rate is
0% and the false negative increases with the incremental increase of the parameter b.
When parameter b is between 10 to 22, the false negative remains stable. Based on
the results show in Figure 6 and Table 1, we choose the parameters b=20, t=8 for
further experiments.
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Figure 6: The False Positive and False Negative Rates in Different Parameter Ranges
b=5 t=3 b=20 t=3 b=50 t=3
FP FN FP FN FP FN
SSHBen 46.49% 54.59% 0.0% 95.67% N/A 100%
Simple-Webserver 46.87% 48.48% 0.0% 90.90% N/A 100%
SSH-Multithread 81.81% 79.16% 0.0% 87.5% N/A 100%
C-Webserver 54.54% 54.54% 0.0% 81.81% N/A 100%
Table 2: The Effect of Different Parameters (FP: false positive; FN: false negative)
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The parameter w is used to determine whether CCFinder will perform inner-
file clone whose results contain clones between different parts of the same software
application, which is not the focus of this paper. Therefore, the parameter w is set
to be f-w-g+ for the purpose of focusing on the inter-file clone.
The default output of the CCFinder is stored in a file with .ccfd as the extension.
Normally, the GUI GemX, which is the front-end of CCFinder, translates the result
into a human-friendly format, such as a clone-set table, scatter plot, or source text.
In our module, only the back-end of CCFinder has been used for the purpose of
accessing the outputs directly. Therefore, we apply the command ./$PATH/ccfx -p
name.ccfd to translate the .ccfd binary file into a human-readable version. Figure 7
shows a small example of the translation process.
The translated file, in the first part of Figure 7, contains only the token infor-
mation, which cannot be directly mapped back to the source code files. To obtain
the corresponding source code clone segments, a second translation is needed. For
this purpose, we have applied a script, post-prettyprint.pl [43], to read the translated
results and to convert the token information into corresponding line numbers in the
source code. The second translated output is saved in an XML file containing the
clone identification(ID), the name of the source code file, and the line numbers of the
cloned segments. All the information produced by CCFinder that is relevant to our
application is obtained after this second translation. However, this result does not
automatically map back to the clone segments in the source code. The next module
focuses on obtaining the necessary information from source code to automatically
trace back to the cloned segments.
4.1.2 The Source Code Labeling and Prediction Module
As mentioned above, the second translated output from CCFinder provides only
the file name and line number of the clone segments, without information needed
for mapping them back to the original source codes. For the purpose of generating





Figure 7: .ccfd file (a),the first translated file(b), and the second translated file(c))
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the clone segments and the source code needs to be established. This second module
is designed for this purpose by automatically retrieving a clone code segment from
the source code according to the result of CCFinder.
In addition, this module also provides probable predictions of potential vulnera-
bilities involved in the clone segments based on the function names, as detailed in
the following. Through examining the CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures)
database, we have discovered that software developers tend to use meaningful func-
tion names, either by combining several English words together with underscore or
by applying Camel Case [20] standard to name the parameter. Certain keywords
inside the function names may indicate the type of potential vulnerabilities to which
the function is prone. Therefore, the function names will provide clues to the types
of potential vulnerabilities introduced inside the clone segments, which is the useful
information to users.
Therefore, we have obtained all the function names related to the C library from
CVE [10] entries dated from 2009 to 2017. Figure 8a presents the top 36 most frequent
keywords (minimum 18 repetitions) from the vulnerable functions. Figure 8b depicts
the vulnerability distribution of the most-repeated keyword read, which has been
repeated up to 221 times among 1867 functions; the x-axis indexes are ordered by the
number of vulnerabilities in each category.
Let N and n be the total number of vulnerabilities among all experiments and
that for one keyword, respectively, we call pk = nN the zero-preference probability.
Meanwhile, let Nc and nc be the total number of vulnerabilities in one category
among all experiments and that for one keyword, respectively, and let pc = ncNc . We
use the difference between pk and pc to indicate the preference for the keyword where
a positive number means the keyword represents a positive preference with respect
to this type of vulnerabilities, and vice versa with negative number.
Figure 8b indicates that the read keyword is prone to be associated with buffer
overflow, executing arbitrary code, and leaking information-related vulnerabilities.

































read read:193→ readbody:10→ readwrite:2→ readcdir:2→ readdir:2→readbox:1→ reader:1→ readexter:1→ readfp:1→readgifim:1→ readline:2→ readme:1→ readobject:1→ reqdreque:1→ readstr:1
decode decode:113→ dec:11→ decompress:11→ decrypt:7→decoder:6→decomp:2→decoded:1→ decodepkt:1→ decodeupdate:1
get get:93→getaddrinfo:3→ get32/64:2→ get8bim:1→ getarena:1→ getautomntbyname:1→ getbands2:1→ getbits:1→ getbuf:1→getcmap:1→ getcode:1→ getcompparms:1→ getdata:3→ getline:1→ gets:1→ gettoken:1→ getvaluebyclass:1→ getword:1
parse parse:96→ parser:2→parseswf:2→parse8bim:1→ parsectrl:1→ parseicon:1→ parserr:1
dissect dissect:92→ dissct:2
process process:57→ proc:3
write write:34→ writel:1→ writeprolog:1→ wrlock:1→ ws:1→ wstr:1→ wstring:1
create create:32
load load:30→ loadcode:1→ loadexponentialfunc:1→ loadit:1
Table 3: The Keywords and Variations
Required Output
Source Code Main Function Pre-process Function Name* Function Line Number* Call Graph Function Definition
cflow X X X X
pycparse X X X X X
Ctag X X X X
Table 4: The Comparison of Different Tools
with buffer overflow and information leakage caused by performing I/O actions. In
addition, the code execution in C language is more likely related to vulnerable input
validation, thus resulting in buffer overflow. Some vulnerability types which contain
only small amounts of results, e.g., directory traversal, http response splitting, SQL
injection, and cross site scripting, are not considered in our experiments to avoid
misleading results. A more detailed discussion of the findings is given in Section 5.5.
To extract the function names from source code, we have compared several tools
for generating and capturing such information in Table 4, as detailed below.
• GNU cflow, a flow graph generator that is part of the GNU Project [55], analyzes
C source files and outputs the dependencies within functions with the main
() function as the entry source [55]. The disadvantages of applying this tool
in our case are threefold. First, the call graph from cflow reveals only the
functions statically invoked either directly or indirectly via the main() entry.
This means the runtime functions are missed completely. Second, the tool
cannot parse customized libraries without the entry point of main () function
inside. Third, the line numbers of functions are missed in the result. The final
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call graph generates the dependency relationships between functions without
any line information, which is needed in Dupsec.
• Pycparser is a parser for the C language, written in pure Python [14]. Pycparser
works under Linux and is easy to install. It is also frequently recommended for
parsing C programs. This tool simply parses the source code and generates the
result with function names, line numbers, and definitions. However, Pycparse
requires the compliable source code as the input. In this case, the C compiler
needs to be invoked as the preprocessor before applying Pycparse. Pycparse re-
quires the C compiler to handle the directives, remove comments, and complete
other tasks related to the compiling process before parsing the source code. It
is evident during our experiments that this requirement for preprocessing sig-
nificantly reduces the applicability of DupSec, which is designed to process any
code segments, whether compliable or not.
• Ctags parses the source code and generates complete results with function names
and the corresponding line numbers [11]. The advantages of Ctags in our ap-
plication are twofold. First, Ctags allows one to take non-compliable code seg-
ments as inputs and a pre-processing step is not required, which increases the
applicability of DupSec. Second, the results obtained from Ctags contain func-
tion names, function line numbers, and the function definition, which provide
a perfect collection of information for generating function names corresponding
to clone segments in DupSec.
In the end, we have chosen Ctags and integrated it into DupSec. We parse the
output of Ctags and store them in the MySQL database under columns ‘line num-
ber’, ‘function name’, ‘file path’, etc. Those information is stored for later analysis
purposes. The function names will later be used to establish statistical correlation
between keywords and vulnerability types, which may provide helpful clues for devel-
opers who may be more interested in specific types of vulnerabilities. Additionally,
this module with its outputs including function names could be used as an API to
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support call-graph related clone detection. Finally, we have used function names as
an indicator for common vulnerabilities across software with different functionalities
in our experiments as detailed in later sections.
4.1.3 The Visualization and CAS Calculation Module
The visualization module generates the results of clone segments while mapping them
back to source code. The results include clone ID, file path, function name, clone seg-
ment, start line number, and end line number. Figure 9 provides an example output
from DupSec corresponding to the source code segments mentioned in Section 3. The
visualized output has been organized as an XML tree with labels. The label contents
contains the source clone segments from CCFinder outputs. Label funcname reveals
the function names corresponding to the clone segments, and label io contains the
common I/O functions.
To calculate CAS (common attack surface), we first need to identify the I/O
functions. In our experiments, we have obtained the list of I/O functions from the
GNU C library [46] (glibc), which is the GNU project’s implementation of C stan-
dard library, as the database for examining the entry/exit points. In total, 256 I/O
functions are stored in our database. Vulnerabilities are usually associated with such
input and output functions, e.g., function memcpy(), which could take user inputs as
the source, and copy them directly to the memory block pointed to by destination.
This function has caused many serious security flaws, such as CVE-2014-0160, i.e.,
the Heartbleed bug [9]. Thus, this kind of functions are considered as entry points
in our experiments. As another example, in Figure 9, the vulnerable I/O function
being shared among software applications is strcpy. The final CAS value is calcu-
lated based on the I/O functions shared among all software applications. To support





















19 else if (!strcmp(temp,"REFERER")) {

















Figure 9: An Example of DupSec Output
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4.2 Automated Analysis Using DupSec
As we have mentioned before, DupSec is an automated tool to identify the com-
mon attack surface among software applications, which may lead to potential vul-
nerabilities shared among software applications. The analysis using DupSec is im-
plemented through a procedure for systematically performing pair-wise comparison
between given software applications.
Algorithm 1 Automated Analysis
Input: A set of software applications S
Output: The XML reports containing detailed CAS information
1: Let S2 = S × S (the set of all pairs in S)
2: for each 〈s1, s2〉 ∈ S2 do
3: Let Clone(s1.s2) be the result of the clone detection module
4: Let T (Clone(s1.s2)) be the result of the translation module
5: Generate intermediate XML report
6: end for
7: for each T (Clone(s1.s2)) do
8: Extract cloned code and function names from the source code
9: Compare common I/O functions
10: Compute CAS values
11: Append the result to the XML report
12: end for
13: return all XML reports
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The procedure shown in Algorithm 1 shows how Dupsec will apply the three
modules to each pair of software applications in order to generate the corresponding
CAS results. With N software applications given as the input, the procedure will be
performed over N ∗ (N − 1)/2 pairs and generate the same number of XML reports
with detailed CAS results also saved into the database for further analysis.
To make the tool more flexible and user friendly, we have implemented two ad-
ditional modules, a configuration module and a logging module. The configuration
module is designed to store all the configuration information, e.g., the input and out-
put paths and the directories of different components and tools, in a .ini file, which
is used to control the way the tool will perform various tasks. This centralized con-
figuration module allows any change made to the directory structures or files to be
easily accommodated without having to modify the tool itself.
Another useful module is the logging module. In this module, we imported the
Python package logging, which is a standard library that enables other Python mod-
ules to participate. By formatting the output of logs, the normal operation of the
tool can be maintained without interruption even if it encounters errors or warnings.
In addition, the operator can trace back to the problems later on, by searching the
log files. The log entries may have five different levels of severity, including DEBUG,
INFO,WARNING,ERROR and CRITICAL, which are detailed in Table 5.
DEBUG Detailed information
INFO Information that the software is working as designed
WARNING Something wrong, but the system still working
ERROR Some functionality cannot be performed as designed
CRITICAL The software cannot continue processing
Table 5: Logging Parameters of DupSec
In addition to the level of severity, our log module also records the processing time
and the current status of the processing, which is helpful when running large scale
experiments. By reading entries at the INFO level, the operator can understand the





This chapter presents experimental results on the common attack surface of real world
software.
5.1 Dataset
To study the common attack surface among real world software applications, we need
a large amount of open-source software to apply our tool for experiments. At the
beginning, we manually downloaded software applications from several open-source
repositories, such as SourceForge and Github. This approach was time consuming
and the number of software applications obtained was limited.
To address this challenge, we decide to develop a script to automatically parse
the download links from the open-source software hosts. Our research shows that
GitHub [18] provides the customized API for users to search open-source software ap-
plications with customized requirements and to download them automatically. The
results are presented in JSON code, which contains the download link of each ap-
plication together with information such as the author name, updating date, size,
and categories. The result of each query is returned on multiple pages with each
page containing 30 result entries. Based on this information, we have developed a
script using the API. In our experiments, we have set the parameter language to
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C programs, and use parameters q, sort, and order to specify the query conditions
and to customize the sequence of results. For example, our customized search link
for database servers is https: // api. github. com/ search/ repositories? q= db+
language: c& sort= stars& order= desc which returns the database servers written
in C language sorted by the stars, i.e., the popularity of the software applications, in
descending order. We have developed the script to parse the JSON format output
from the GitHub automatically and to store the information of the software download
link, authors, publish time, size, and other descriptions into our local database. All
the download links for each software application are stored separately. Since Github
has a limitation with respect to the maximum requests in a certain amount of time,
we design the process to sleep for certain time after each query. We complete the
collection of software applications after the script finishes parsing all the download
links and storing them in the local directory.
Our experimental environment is a virtual machine running Ubuntu 14.04, with
the Intel core i3-4150 central processing unit and 8.0GB of RAM. We have applied
our tool to totally 293 different software applications belonging to seven categories.
The number of software applications in each category is as follows: 32 Databases,
62 Web servers, 25 SSH servers, 79 FTP servers, 41 TFTP servers, 6 IMAP servers,





= 42778 pairs of software
applications tested using our tool in our experiments.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first validate our models through the study of
correlation between common attack surface and vulnerabilities in Section 5.2. Then,
we apply DupSec to study the existence of common attack surface between different
categories of software applications in Section 5.3, and the trend of common attack
surface within the same category in Section 5.4. In the end, we study the implication
of function names in Section 5.5.
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5.2 Common Attack Surface and Vulnerabilities
Although the concept of attack surface is not intended as a one-to-one mapping
to actual vulnerability, the size of attack surface can provide a rough indicator for
the abundance of vulnerabilities, since entry and exit points represent the interfaces
exposed by the software for accepting inputs from (or sending outputs to) the outside
environment. Consequently, the existence of common attack surface between two
software applications may also indicate shared vulnerabilities. Therefore, we study the
correlation between the two in this section. Seven categories of software applications
are downloaded and used in the experiment, and our results reveal that common
attack surface exists not only inside each category of software applications but also
between those with different functionalities.
To evaluate the correlation between common attack surface and vulnerabilities,
we examine pairs of software applications with respect to the results of a vulnerability
scanner called Flawfinder [54]. Flawfinder is an open-source tool that can be used to
scan C and C++ source code and report potential vulnerabilities [54]. It is regarded
as an effective tool for detecting misused functions with ranked risks. For the purpose
of verifying the relationship between common attack surface and vulnerabilities, we
manually compare the Dupsec outputs with the results of Flawfinder.
Our findings indicate that common vulnerabilities may indeed be correlated with
common attack surface. For example, we examined the two software SSH and simple-
webserverche, which are of the category SSH and Webserver applications, respec-
tively. In SSH, the main file uses function strcat to copy data to an internal parameter
user_name, and those data are applied without any boundary check. The same thing
happens in the application simplewebserverche where a file named server.c calls func-
tion handle_response() to apply function strcat. The source parameter curr_time is
applied before the boundary checking. Our tool Dupsec detects these code fragments
as a common attack surface, while flawfinder reports that both have the potential to










Table 6: Percentage of Detected Vulnerabilities Which Correlate to Reported Common
Attack Surface
The above example demonstrates that common attack surface reported by Dupsec
may indeed correlate with similar vulnerabilities detected by Flawfinder. To evaluate
the extent of such correlation, we compare the outputs of Flawfinder and Dupsec,
and Table 6 shows the degree of correlation between common attack surface and
vulnerabilities.
As revealed in Table 6, in every category of software applications, there exist
certain percentage of vulnerabilities which correlate to the common attack surface
reported by our tool. The results also show that, although not every attack surface
is vulnerable, they correspond to a superset of the detected vulnerabilities. In the
following sections, we show studies on the common attack surface of software appli-
cations between different categories and within the same category, and we show how
the common attack surface relates to various factors, such as the category, the publish
time, and the size of the software.
5.3 Cross-Category Common Attack Surface
In this section, we study the two-proposed common attack surface measures through
a study of real world software applications which covers 42778 distinct software ap-
plication combinations (pairs) using our tool, Dupsec. The first set of experiments
reveal the existence of common attack surface between different categories of software
applications.
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To convert the results to a comparable scale, we have normalized the absolute
value of common attack surface reported by Dupsec by the size of the software ap-
plications. The normalization factor used for the cases where software application A
is to be compared to software application B (the common attack surface to be nor-
malized is cas(A|B)) is denoted as AB. On the contrary, when software application
B is to be compared with software application A to calculate cas(B|A), then the
normalization factor is denoted as BA. Since the sizes of both software are typically
quite large, we have used log1000(AB)/1000 and log1000BA/1000 in our experiments
based on our experiences (except for cases where we explicitly mention the absolute
value of common attack surface is used).
Results and Implications: Figures 10 through 16 show the existence of common
attack surface across seven categories. The percentages on top of the bars inside each
figure indicate the level of common attack surface between the category mentioned in
the title of the figure and all the seven categories. We can observe that common attack
surface exists in all the category combinations. For example, the DB category has
the highest level of common attack surface inside its own category (between different
software inside that category), 27.9%, and it also shares more than 9% common attack
surface with any other category.
In summary, the results across all categories are shown in the heat map in Table 7
where a darker color indicates a larger cas value between the pair of categories. A
visible diagonal with the darkest color in the heat map indicates the expected trend
that different software in the same category yield the highest level of common attack
surface, most likely due to their similar functionality, except for SSH. In fact, the
category SSH has the lowest level of common attack surface within its category. The
reason is that the SSH category only contains 25 software applications, which is
not sufficiently large to produce any reliable trend. Due to similar reasons, we have
omitted the results from the IMAP category in the heat-map.
After understanding the general existence of common attack surface among the
seven categories of software applications, we aim to study more specific trends in
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Figure 10: The Common Attack Surface between FTP and All the Categories

































Figure 11: The Common Attack Surface between FireWall and All the Categories
our second sets of experiments. We first examine the distribution of absolute values
of common attack surface to study the effect of normalization. Second, we use the
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Figure 12: The Common Attack Surface between DB and All the Categories



































Figure 13: The Common Attack Surface between WebServer and All the Categories
normalized results to obtain the trend of common attack surface in the sizes and time
(i.e., the year of publishing) of the software applications, respectively. Finally, we
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Figure 14: The Common Attack Surface between SSH and All the Categories































Figure 15: The Common Attack Surface between TFTP and All the Categories
study the trend of our second measure, the probabilistic common attack surface.
Results and Implications: Figure 17 shows the accumulated number of pairs of
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Figure 16: The Common Attack Surface between IMAP and All the Categories
software applications in the absolute value of common attack surface. The figure de-
picts only the results with a nonzero value, which include totally 9,852 pairs (which
amounts to about 1/8 of the total number of pairs). We can observe that the accu-
mulated number of pairs of software applications increases quickly before the value of
common attack surface reaches about 12. Afterwards the accumulation of software
applications increases slowly until the common attack surface reaches about 27, and
then the accumulation flattens out. Those results lead to following two implications.
FTP FireWall DB Web-Server SSH TFTP
FTP 18.2 13.8 13.7 17.9 12.8 15.3
FireWall 47.1 67.6 42.2 61.8 31.7 51.7
DB 14.4 13.9 38.4 18.8 12.8 14.1
WebServer 32.2 35.6 28.6 56.9 24.4 56.3
SSH 13.9 15.0 12.5 13.8 11.8 13.7
TFTP 19.8 25.5 16.5 22.4 19.6 32.6
Table 7: HeatMap for Common Attack Surface in Different Categories
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Figure 17: The Common Attack Surface in Accumulated Pairs of Software Applications
First, the existence of common attack surface between different software appli-
cations seem pervasive. Among all the combinations of software applications, about
20% share common clone segments, and 56% of the clone segments contain at least
one common attack surface. The reason for this could be that I/O functions are
commonly used by developers in the same or similar manner, either because those
are established coding practices or due to code reusing. For example, between the
two software applications, cwebserver and simplewebservercart, there exist a common
function, bind invoked by other common functions, e.g., open_clientfd, open_listenfd
and prepare_socket, which all contribute to the common attack surface.
Second, on the other hand, we should not expect to see a large common attack
surface value between different software applications. From our experimental results,
it is clear that the absolute value of common attack surface between different software
applications remains relatively small, with the majority of the results to be under ten
per pair of software applications. We believe this is reasonable since in most cases
two different software applications are not supposed to share a lot of code. We note
this result may be influenced by the parameters chosen in CCFinder to identify clone
segments, e.g., a smaller size for the clone segments will result in more clone segments
to be identified.
Figure 18 depicts the relationship between common attack surface and sizes of the
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Figure 18: Common Attack Surface in Accumulated Software Application Pairs vs Size
software. We use the absolute values of common attack surface in this experiment.
For the sizes, we use the normalized combined sizes log1000(AB)/1000 when software
A is compared with software B. The X-axis depicts the indices of sizes ordered by the
normalization factor; index 1 indicates the smallest sizes, and index 200 indicates the
largest sizes. We have presented both scattered and trending results in the figure. We
can observe that, with increasing sizes of the software, the value of common attack
surface generally increases. This is as expected since the attack surface is based on
the number of I/O functions, which is roughly proportional to the size of the software.
Figure 19 compares the average number of I/O functions and the average common
attack surface over several years. The blue bars indicate the average number of I/O
functions used in the software applications tested in our experiments based on the
publishing year. Although the average number of I/O functions per software applica-
tion does not have a simple trend over time (as far as the software applications tested
in our experiments are concerned), we can use this as a baseline for comparing with
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Figure 19: Common Attack Surface Trend in Years
the average value of common attack surface over time. We can observe a clear down-
ward trend in the average value of common attack surface over time, with software
published around 2010 having a much higher value of common attack surface com-
pared with more recent years, regardless of the number of average I/O functions. We
believe this trend shows that code reusing plays a major role in common attack sur-
face, since the trend can be easily explained by the backward nature of code reusing
(i.e., programmers can only reuse the code that has been written at an earlier time)
which means older software will more likely share common attack surface with other
software.
Figure 20 explores the trend of the probabilistic common attack surface measure
versus the total number of I/O functions (called the size in the figure). Recall that
the probabilistic common attack surface measure reveals the diversity between two
software applications where a larger value indicates a lower diversity level. Although
previously we have seen that the absolute value of common attack surface increases





















Figure 20: The Probabilistic cas measure
common attack surface measure actually decreases in Figure 20. The reason for
this counter-intuitive result is that, the increase of the number of I/O functions in
software applications is faster than the increase of common attack surface, so the
value of the probabilistic common attack surface measure decreases with the increase
of the number of I/O functions.
In fact, both Figure 18 and Figure 19 match the results of existing vulnerability
discovery models (as reviewed in the related work section), which generally show that
larger software applications typically have more vulnerabilities but a lower probability
for having vulnerabilities per unit of software size. For example, Google Chrome (with
the number of lines at 14,137,145 [1]) has 1,453 vulnerabilities over nine years [10],
while Apache (with the number of lines at 1,800,402) has 815 over 19 years. However,
the probability of having one vulnerability per unit of software size per year is 1.15 ∗
10−3% for Chrome and 2.4 ∗ 10−3% for Apache (i.e., the larger Chrome has less
vulnerabilities per unit of software size).
In the third set of the experiments, we aim to study the relationship between
functionalities and common attack surface. Previously we have seen that common
attack surface not only exist between software in the same category but also across
different categories, as shown in Figures 10 through 16 and Table 7. Since the exact
functionality of software applications is not easy to characterize automatically, we
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Figure 21: cas vs Functionalities in FTP with All the Categories
rely on the simple method of inferring it from keywords inside function names, as
described in Section 4.1.2. Although this method may be inaccurate and misclassify
the functionality of some software, it allows us to automatically extract results from
a large number of software applications and correlate the results with common attack
surface.
Results and Implications: Figures 21 through 27 shows the common attack surface
of each category of software applications. In the figure, RF indicate the results for
what we call software applications with relevant functionalities, which means the func-
tion names inside each pair of software applications contain some common keywords
implying similar functionality (see Section 4.1.2), and IF means irrelevant functional-
ities (no common keyword exists in the function names). The percentages on top of
each bar represents the average ratio of common attack surface in each category. We
can see from the results that common attack surface does exist both between software
with similar functionalities and between those with different functionalities. Although
in most cases common attack surface is more likely to exist between software with
48
similar functionalities, the difference is not significant. Therefore, we can conclude
that common attack surface is not necessarily related to similarity in functionality.



















































Figure 22: cas vs Functionalities for FireWall with All the Categories


















































Figure 23: cas vs Functionalities for DB with All the Categories
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Figure 24: cas vs Functionalities for WebServer with All the Categories


















































Figure 25: cas vs Functionalities for SSH with All the Categories
We have also studied the relative popularity of I/O functions among common
attack surface to see which of those functions are most likely to result in common
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Figure 26: cas vs Functionalities for TFTP with All the Categories




















































Figure 27: cas vs Functionalities for IMAP with All the Categories
attack surface. First, we rank for the I/O functions among all common attack surface
to determine the top ranked I/O functions. Second, we show the I/O functions
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corresponding to different keywords to observe the relationship between I/O functions
and various functionalities.
Results and Implications: As seen in figure 28, the I/O functions most frequently
appearing in common attack surface are memset, bind, and accept. Among these,
memset occurs most often because most of our software are server-related applica-
tions, which typically involves lots of copying and setting. For example, in the software
application webserma, the function start contains code memset(&amp;serv_addr, 0,
sizeof(serv_addr)), which initializes the server addresses with 0 s, which has the same
pattern as the code in another software dbasepeclphp7 and produces the common
attack surface between the two software. The second and third most frequently ap-
pearing I/O functions, bind and accept, are the functions related to the socket; the
bind assigns an address to a socket, and accept accepts a connection on a socket; bind
is also corresponding to the most frequently used keyword, create 28(b). In Figure
28(b), the two representative keywords, read and create are chosen to show the corre-
sponding I/O functions that are top ranked based on their occurrence in the common
attack surface. It can be seen that different keywords have different correlated I/O
functions.
5.4 Common Attack Surface in the Same Category
of Software Applications
We study the trend of common attack surface between software within the same
category in this section. We study common attack surface in terms of sizes for the
two categories WebServer and FTP in the first set of experiments. We compare the
trend over time and the trend of the probabilistic common attack surface measure
inside the same category. In the end, we study the common attack surface against
functionalities inside the same category.
Results and Implications: Figure 29 depicts the common attack surface for dif-
ferent sizes of software in the category WebServer, represented in both scattered and
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Figure 28: Top 10 I/O Functions (a) and CVE (b) for Different Functionalities
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trending results. The orange scattered points and the dotted line indicate the result
and the red dotted line is the same trend borrowed from Figure 18 for comparison,
which corresponds to the overall common attack surface. The scattered purple points
and the dotted line in Figure 30 is the result inside the FTP category. We can ob-
serve that the trend of common attack surface in both categories increase with the
size, which follows a similar trend as the cross-category result. However, the trend of
WebServer increases faster than the cross-category trend, which matches the results
shown in Table 7, i.e., WebServer has the highest percentage of common attack sur-
face inside its own category, 27.1%, which is significantly higher than the common
attack surface cross categories. On the other hand, in the figure 30, the trend in
the FTP category grows slightly slower than the cross-category trend, which can be
explained by the fact that FTP shares a large amount of common attack surface with
WebServer and TFTP (which can be seen from Table 7).














Figure 29: Common Attack Surface(s0d) vs Size for WebServers
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Figure 30: Common Attack Surface(s0d) vs Size for FTP
Figure 31 depicts the trend of common attack surface over time in the same cat-
egory. Each blue bar represents the average number of I/O functions in the years
in the same category of the experiments. The red line shows the average number of
common attack surface in those years. Compared to Figure 19, the common attack
surface in the same category has higher values, which also match the previous obser-
vations. The trend over time matches the trend we have obtained cross categories,
i.e., older software applications tend to have more opportunities to share common
attack surface with other software.
Figure 32 reveals the trend of the probabilistic common attack surface measure
versus the size in the same category, which shows a similar trend as the cross-category
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Figure 32: Common Attack Surface vs Size over Time in the Same Category
result as shown in Figure 20, although the trend within the same category starts from
a higher value around 0.20 (in contrast, the cross-category measure starts from 0.06).
In Table 8, for categories such as FTP, FireWall, WebServer, SSH, and TFTP, the
percentage value of common attack surface for software with similar functionalities is
lower compared with the result for software with different functionalities. However,
in Figure 33, we can see the absolute value of common attack surface for similar
functionalities is much larger than that for different functionalities. To explain this,
we use FireWall as an example. The reason is that several software applications in
the FireWall category contain functions with random names, and they contain also
lots of common I/O functions with software applications in other categories, which
contributes significantly to the number of common attack surface.
5.5 The Distribution of Function Names
From the results obtained from CVE, we have discovered that different verbs in func-
tion names are related to different vulnerabilities. Figure 34 is generated based on
the CVE data from year 2009 to year 2017. We have focused on the vulnerabilities
related to C language. Seven most popular vulnerabilities are identified, with Dential
of Service, Overflow and Execute Code as the top three. From the data we parsed, the
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Table 8: Percentage Value of Common Attack Surface
most frequently appearing keywords in function names are read, decode, and parse.
For bars with positive values, it means that the verb has a probability to be related
to the given vulnerability, and a higher bar indicates a larger probability. In addition,
bars with negative values indicate the function containing this verb is irrelevant to
the vulnerability. For example, the functions that contain read have a greater chance
of having Memory Corruption vulnerability and less chance of having bypass Restric-























Related Work and Background
Knowledge
This chapter reviews related work and provides a brief introduction to some back-
ground knowledge.
6.1 Clone detection
Source code clone detection tools aim to find the cloned code segments between two
given software applications. Existing research has led to extensive developments in
the field of both clone detection tools and approaches; it should be noted that many
of these tools are mainly for research purposes [47].
There are four main types of clone detection approaches as follows [47].
• Type I identical code fragments
• Type II structurally or syntactically identical fragments
• Type III copied fragments with further modifications
• Type IV detecting code fragments perform same function but implemented syn-
tactic differently
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The aforementioned categories usually correspond to different detection tech-
niques, which will be briefly introduced in the following section.
Text-based clone detection Text-based clone detection is mainly based on ana-
lyzing source code as text or string. Thus, if two segments of string or text sequences
are detected to be similar, the fragments are reported as clone codes. Because of the
natural feature of the text-based approach, the structural characteristics of the given
programming language is not taken into consideration. The clone detection process
usually can be performed without normalizing the source code, as the process deals
with the raw code of application. But there are still certain preparatory steps that
must be applied prior to undergoing the detection process as follows. The first is
removing the comments based on the rule of different languages, and the second is
removing whitespaces including all forms of blanks.
For example, we will discuss one of the popular tools in text-based clone detec-
tion, Dup [3]. If two lines of code are identical after removing all whitespaces and
comments, they are recognized as clone codes. The longest line that is detected to
be matched are generated as the output, but the minimum length of the reported
code can be customized according to different needs. For the purpose of obtaining
the longest matches, Dup applies following two steps.
First, in order to assign identical integers, Dup uses lexical analysis to hash the
lines. It then applies the string to the scatter plot; if the diagonals are found to
be equivalent, the strings are detected. In order to implement this process, two
algorithms are applied. The first requires a longer run-time, but takes up less space.
The second one, based on suffix tree data structure, is more effective with a shorter
run time; however, it requires three times more space than the previous one. Dup
has two main problems. First, it fails to detect parameter names within code of the
same logic; second, it cannot detect different coding styles, like the for statement and
do-while statement.
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Another well-known approach [23] is applying the fingerprint to identify the re-
dundancy of a substring in the source code. There are two steps, first, calculating the
fingerprint of substrings within the source code; then, sort the fingerprint value and
remove the one that occurs only once. The fingerprinting calculation uses KARP-
Rabin’s string matching approach [26, 27] to calculate the length of all n substrings.
In order to detect consecutive lines, a single, random letter are applied to replace each
maximal sequence of alphanumeric characters. The entirety of the matching process
consists of three steps: transforming source code to discard unimportant codes, di-
viding the source file into substrings, and identifying the matching substrings. If
there are any near-missing clone codes, all whitespace must be removed, and the
alphanumeric characters must be replaced by the letter ‘i’.
Consider the following example:
for (parama=0; parama<bound; ++parama)
is transformed to
for(i=0;i<i;++i)




These preprocessing steps are served to reduce many false positives. By applying
these approaches, the file-level structure changes can be detected in different versions.
Ducasse developd [12] duploc which was designed to be a parsing-free, language-
independent tool. It first reads the source file and sequences of the lines, second
removes all comments and whitespace to create a set of condensed lines. Afterward,
a comparison is made based on the hash result, where scatter-plots indicate the
visualization of a cloned result. The authors apply the Dynamic Pattern Matching
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algorithm. Still, since duploc is a language-independent tool, it lacks the ability to
obtain meaningful clone resolutions. While normalization does not usually apply
in text-based detection, Ducasse [12] applies some transformation to the code, not
limited to removal of whitespace and comments but removing any of the uninteresting
language fragments. For exmaple:




Might be transformed to
staticintitem=1
intcount=1
As indicated in the transformation process, the white spaces and uninteresting
parts in the main function have been removed.
The last tool, DuDe [53] is another language-independent detection tool based
on lines. It parses duplication chains to combine small exact clones. The detection
process consists of three steps, which are code preprocessing, the scatter-plot pop-
ulation, and the duplication chains building. The program generates the strings by
considering whether a current chunk can be considered valid, and an assessment made
by measuring if the size is larger than the minimum threshold. If so, the program
continues searching for the next piece, which is added under the condition it does not
exceed the maximum limit.
Token-based clone detection Token-based clone detection is also one of the
widely applied method. In token-based clone detection, the process can be summa-
rized into three steps.
• First, performing a lexical analysis in order to generate a sequence of tokens
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• Second, using the sequence of tokens to make a comparison and find the dupli-
cated subsequence [21]
• Third, matching the tokens back into the text and output the cloned result.
The matching algorithms may be either suffix-tree or suffix-array matching al-
gorithms.
One of the representative tools in token-based detection is CCFinder [25], which
is applied in our work. The first step of the clone-detecting process is running a
lexical analysis in accordance with the lexical rules of the corresponding language.
Afterward, every line of the source file is translated into tokens. CCFinder detects
clones by concatenating all the tokens into a token sequence, removing all whitespaces
in the process. Once the sequence is generated, it is transformed by the rules of
the programming language, and the identifiers are replaced by individual tokens.
Upon completion of the transformation, the substrings are sent for matching-based
detection. In order to achieve an efficient matching, CCFinder applies the suffix-tree
algorithm. The clone location information is then expressed as a tree with nodes of
shared identical subsequence. Clone pairs can then be identified by searching tree.
Once the clone tokens are detected, a mapping process from token to clone code
is required to obtain the source code. CCFinder can support multiple languages
including C++, C, JAVA,COBOL,VB,C#. The following codes demonstrate the
transforming process.









After applying the transformation rule, the code becomes:
void print (const set& num){
int count =0;






Next, algorithms are applied to replace the parameters with tokens; in this exam-
ple, the identifiers are replaced by the token $p. Finally, the suffix-tree algorithm is
applied to identify the token sequence of each substring.
\$p $p ($p $p& $p){
$p $p =$p;






Baker’s Dup [3, 4] implements a similar approach as CCFinder. The detection
process begins by tokenizing the source code, then using a suffix-tree algorithm to
compare tokens. Unlike CCFinder, Dup does not apply transformation, but rather
consistently renames the identifier.
Raimar Falke [32] develops a tool called iclones [19], which uses suffix-trees to
find clones in abstract syntax trees that can operate in linear time and space. The
detection approaches are completed by parsing codes, generating AST, and using the
serialized AST as an input in the suffix tree detection.
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CP-Miner [34] as a well-designed token-based clone detector, uses frequent subse-
quence mining algorithms to detect tokenized segments. The aforementioned tools,
CCFinder and Dup, failed to identify the inserted code, since their code fragments
break down the token sequence. CP-Miner does not have this problem, since its
mining algorithm is able to identify clone codes with interleaving sequence gaps.
RTF [5] is a token-based clone detector that uses string algorithms for efficient detec-
tion; rather than using the more common suffix-tree, it utilizes more memory-efficient
suffix array.
Tree-based clone detection The tree-based detector usually transfers the code to
an abstract syntax tree (AST) by applying the language-oriented parser. Because the
tree contains the complete information of the source code, certain sized subtrees are
applied into the comparison process. Similar subtrees are detected, and corresponding
source code is returned as clone pairs. The incapability of detecting large-scale source
code is the biggest shortcoming of tree-based detector. But it is capable of detecting
inserted and deleted codes.
One of the leading tools using AST-based algorithm is the CloneDR developed
by Baxter [7] which can detect exact and near-miss clone through applying hashing
and dynamic algorithm. The algorithm of this tool can be summarized into three
steps; first, parsing and generating AST tree by the compiler generator tool; second,
using the sequence detection algorithm to find the sub-tree clones; third, to locate
near missing clones by a combination of other clones. The ccdiml [44] developed
by Bauhaus is similar to the CloneDR in the way of dealing with hash and code
sequences. And instead of using AST, it applies IML algorithm in the comparing
process.
David and Nicholas [17] develop a tool named Sim which uses a standard lexical
analyzer to generate a parsing-tree of two given software applications. The code
similarity is determined by applying the maximum common subsequence and dynamic
programming.
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Graph-based clone detection Program Dependency Graph(PDG)-based algo-
rithm is a higher level of abstracting the code representation compared with other
algorithms. The algorithm generates the semantic information through the process of
data flow. One of the leading PDG-based tools is PDG-DUP presented by Komondoor
and Horwit [29]
The PDG-based detector considers semantic information. Komondoor and Hor-
witz’s PDG-DUP [29] is the leading PDG-based detection tool, which identifies clones
together and keeping the semantics of the source code to reflect software. The al-
gorithm has three steps. First, ignoring the name and the value of the parameter,
separating and grouping the PDG nodes into equivalent classes; second, removing the
subsumed clones; the last step is to combine those clones and use transitive closure to
combine small groups of clone code into larger groups. The most significant limitation
of the PDG-based tools is that they don’t support large sized programs.
Metric-based clone detection In the Metric-based clone detection algorithms,
instead of comparing the code, it compares metrics applied to code fragments. One
of the techniques used is applying fingerprinting to generate metrics of classes or the
functions within the source code. The clone codes are detected through the value of
metrics.
In [37] Mayrand uses the tool Darix to generate the metric. The clone identifica-
tion is based on four values, which are name, layout, expression and control flow [37].
In order to support different languages, after generating the AST, the information is
translated into the Intermediate Representation Language (IRL) [2] which contains
four categories of information. The first deals with the software architecture, the
second about the software data type, the third the control flow of the software, and
the last the flow of data. The clone is detected in pairs only.
Kontogiannis [30] uses Markov models to compute the dissimilarity of the code by
applying the abstract pattern matching. To improve it, in [31] Kontogiannis proposes
two methods for clone detection. The first is the direct comparison of metric values,
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the comparation is at the level of begin-end. The second is based on a dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm; the comparison is on the statement level of begin-end block, and
the result is more accurate with less false positives. Five widely used metrics are ap-
plied in the direct comparison [31], which are the number of functions called (fanout);
the ratio of input/output variables to the fanout; the McCabe cyclometric complexity;
the modified Albrecht’s function point metric; the modified Henry-Kafura’s informa-
tion flow quality metric. The similarity is calculated based on those five-dimensional
vectors. On the other hand, the dynamic programming works on the abstract feature
sets. The features are consisted of 1. variables and its definition; 2. definitions of
data types; 3. the previous five metrics.
Hybrid clone-based clone detection Besides the detection technique mentioned
above, there are some other approaches that using hybrid clone detections.
In [32], the authors apply the suffix trees to find clones in AST; this approach can
find clones in linear time and space. The algorithm they applied can be summarized
into four steps [32]: first, parsing the source code to generate the AST; second,
serializing the AST tree; third, applying the suffix tree detection algorithm on the
clone code; forth, decomposing the result into the syntactic units. The comparison
process is based on the tokens of the AST-nodes.
6.2 Attack Surface
The attack surface is the subset of a system’s resources that can be used by attackers
to exploit the system [36]. Since it is challenging to measure security on a quantitative
and qualitative basis, the authors formalize a notion of the system’s attack surface in
order to more accurately indicate a system’s security.
The attack surface can be accessed through three different sources: entry/exit
points, channels, and untrusted data items. Thus, the subset of attack surfaces
remains the most likely point of potential attacks, as actions can only be launched by
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sending data to the system or receiving data from the system. However, not all the
attack surface can be used by the attacker, thus the contribution of resources cannot
be measured equally. The definition of the resource damage potential defines how
serious an attacker can damage a system or how much effort it takes for the attacker
to get the corresponding rights to do the attack.
In addition, damage is measured from several aspects, including method privilege,
access right, channel protocol, and data item type [36]. For example, consider this
basic formula when measuring the attack surface: if A has a larger attack surface
than B (with other condition equivalent), then any attack working for B would also
work for A. The quantitative measure can be used to measure the absolute attack
surface. The detailed method is to estimate the total contribution of all the three
vectors, which are the methods, the channels, and the data items.
6.3 Software Diversity
Software diversity has long been employed for security. The model in [41] gives a
threshold to measure the software diversity’s capability of resisting the viral propaga-
tion. The authors in [42] studies the enhancement of the computer system’s reliability
by exploitation of software diversity, because a diversified system which composed of
multiple alternative versions is more reliable than the system with any single version
alone, although it is not clear how the diversity among a collection of versions can
be optimally achieved. The authors in [35] define and formalize the concept of soft-
ware diversity from four different points of view which are: structural diversity, fault
diversity, tough-spot diversity, and failure diversity; they proposed a way to quantify
software diversity and applied it during the life cycle of NVS. The authors in [40]
present the distributed algorithms which can be used to assign software packages to
different systems thus to analyzes their performances. Their goal is to put limitation
on a malicious node from compromising its neighboring nodes by using the same ap-
proach, thus to protect the whole network. Unlike those excising works, in our work
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we propose a new approach to defining software diversity from the security point of
view by measuring diversity in terms of common attack surface.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we have made four main contributions.
• First, we defined software diversity based on the novel concept of common attack
surface.
• Second, we have implemented a new tool Dupsec which can perform the common
attack surface calculation automatically.
• Third, we have conducted experiments on real software applications and ex-
amined the common attack surface from different dimensions, and analyzed its
relationship with vulnerabilities.
• In the end, we have also analyzed and found that function names have certain
indications towards vulnerabilities.
However, our work still has some limitations which will lead to our future work.
We briefly summarize some future directions as follows.
• First, we borrow the clone code detection tool CCFinder, which requires signif-
icant time and resources when applied to large software. Due to this limitation,
we have not extended our experiments to very lager software applications, which
limits our experimental scope. In the future, we would like to extend our ex-
periments to cover more software.
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• Second, the software applications we use are fetched from the public open source
host Github. It provides us a good source of software applications, but many of
those are developed by individuals and not very widely used, so the information
about vulnerabilities are usually not available in CVE. Also, we are not able
to apply our tool to the major software applications appearing in CVE due to
the size limitation of our tool and the fact many such software applications are
not open-sourced. Our future direction is to address this issue and expand the
scope of our experiments.
• Third, since we only cover the entry and exit functions of the c standard li-
braries, DupSec is limited to the c programmed projects for the time being. For
C++ and Java, since we have APIs for those two languages, once the entry and
exit libraries of these two languages are generated the tool can also be applied.
In fact, as long as the I/O libraries are provided, Dupsec can be extended to
any given language.
• Fourth, all of our experiments are done on a single machine, which is not pow-
erful enough to apply to a large amount of software applications. The next step
is to apply it based on a distributed system to perform the tasks in parallel.
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